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Abstract: 
We examine how the impact of the recent crises on firm performance, in terms of risk of shutdown, 
differed depending on firm size. We use a panel of linked employer-employee data covering the 
period 2002-2012 and investigate whether the effect of firm size varies over the business cycle and 
with the type of shock associated with two phases of economic contraction: the Financial Crisis 
and the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Our results show that smaller firms are more likely to shutdown 
than larger firms, with micro firms being nearly three times more likely to shutdown than large 
firms. However, within each size band, micro firms are found to experience at least similar rates of 
survival during the two crises, relative to large firms, to those observed in the pre-crisis period; 
while medium sized firms are found to be more vulnerable during the financial crisis period, but 
show more resilience during the sovereign debt crisis. Overall, however, the results suggest that 
during the sovereign debt crisis firms faced higher probability of closing than during the financial 
crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis made access to credit from banks more difficult and imposed 
financial constraints on Portuguese small and young firms (Iyer et al., 2014). It has been 
suggested that access to financing, credit extension and favourable lending options become 
less available to small and young firms during times of macroeconomic instability 
(McGuinness and Hogan, 2014; Cowling et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2008). As a 
consequence, the risk of such firms exiting the market increases, as predicted by the 
industrial economics theory of firm exit (e.g. Geroski et al., 2007; Caves, 1998; Everett 
and Watson, 1998; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Siegfried and Evans, 1994). Moreover, 
financial constraints were compounded by an erosion of market confidence making 
financial assistance from Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and 
International Monetary Fund) essential to sustain the country’s debt and prevent 
insolvency.  
Credit constraints, on the one hand, are known to lower the innovation, growth and 
survival of small businesses in particular (e.g. Saridakis et al., 2013; OECD, 2012; 
Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Geroski and Machin, 1993), 
which is the predominant firm size in Portugal (SMEs represent 99% of all business 
population). It has also been argued that there is a differential response of firms in terms of 
growth and survival, depending on their access to capital and on their network structure. 
Furthermore, the fact that smaller firms lack control of their external environment (Storey 
and Sykes, 1996) and are more sensitive to funding and demand shocks than larger firms, 
also reduces their chances of survival (Mach and Wolken, 2012; Holton et al., 2012; Artola 
and Genre, 2011; Raz and Gloor, 2007; Berger and Udell, 2002; Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1994). On the other hand, shocks to the banks’ balance sheets and credit rating downgrades 
affect capital markets, interest rates and international relations. This is likely to affect 
larger firms’ funding, international trade, investment and capital structure and hence their 
chances of growth and survival (e.g. Almeida et al., 2014; Claessens et al., 2012; Ivashina 
and Scharfstein, 2010; Lee et al., 2009; Liu, 2004).   
The determinants of firm exit and survival have been widely studied in both 
management and economic literature (see, for example, Hyytinen et al., 2015; 
Bhattacharjee et al. 2007, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Agarwal and Gort, 2002, Robson, 
1996). This paper, however, adds to the existing literature on firm survival in that we 
empirically investigate both the impact of the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis 
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on the survival of Portuguese firms, and examine whether this varies according to firm 
size. Previous research finds that small firms have higher exit rates than large firms (see, 
for example, DeTienne and Wennberg, 2016; Hart and Oulton, 1999), but our paper 
attempts to distinguish the effect of the two economic shocks on different sized firms 
contrasting the pre-crisis period to the financial crisis and the debt crisis eras. In addition, 
this allows us to reveal potential strategic differences in the levels of resilience and 
adaptability by firm size. We expect that the effect of the financial crisis will be more 
detrimental on smaller firms than larger ones, which are better prepared to withstand 
contraction in market demand, can access alternative financial sources during lending 
contractions, and are more likely to hold foreign affiliations (hence scatter the risks). But 
as the financial crisis transformed into a sovereign debt crisis and the country’s risk 
premium increased, the vulnerability and exposure of large firms is also expected to 
increase (due to a decrease in  the supply of credit to the country, trade shocks and balance 
sheet effects, for example).  
The choice of Portugal as the country for analysis, is based on the fact that while 
for most OECD countries the Great Recession relates to the economic contraction that 
followed the Global Financial Crisis (see van Ours, 2015), Portugal – similar to other 
GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) – has not only experienced the 
economic contraction that the Financial Crisis precipitated, but also embarked on a fiscal 
consolidation programme to restore debt sustainability. Hence, Portugal offers a good 
setting to study the effect of different shocks on firm survival. Additionally, given that our 
analyses are focussed on the patterns of firm closure before and during the recent crises, 
we use data for the period between 2002 and 2012.1 We use linked employer-employee 
data allows us to track firms over the study period controlling for characteristics of the firm 
and of its workforce. In particular, we investigate whether firm survival rates vary by firm 
size over the business cycle (pre-crisis vs. recession), and with the type of shock associated 
to the phase of economic contraction (Financial Crisis vs. Sovereign Debt Crisis). 
Our results are interesting and shed more light on the importance of firm size on 
firm survival. We show that smaller firms are more likely to shutdown than larger firms, 
with micro firms being nearly three times more likely to close down than large firms. This 
is quite a standard result compared with the existing empirical literature. Interesting results, 
                                                 
1
 2012 is the most recent year for which the data set has been made available. Between 1994 and 2002 the 
Portuguese business cycle is described by one single phase of economic expansion. 
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however, are found when we distinguish between the two shocks. Specifically, we find that 
medium sized firms are more vulnerable during the financial crisis period, but show more 
resilience during the sovereign debt crisis. In contrast, micro firms are found to experience 
increasing rates of survival between the two crises. This result supports evidence from 
previous work that has found that smaller firms were able to adapt to recession conditions 
in ways (e.g. reducing salaries and working time, innovation) that enabled them to survive 
(Lai et al., 2016; Bartz and Winkler, 2015; Smallbone et al., 2012; Kitching et al., 2009; 
Kalbfleisch, 2006). Overall, although we find that the two crises led to an increase in the 
hazard rates of firm shutdown, firms faced higher probability of closing during the 
sovereign debt crisis than during the financial crisis. To some extent, some of the 
shutdowns occurring in 2010 and after may be a consequence of the financial crisis of 
2007-09, but during the austerity period market demand, economic growth, consumer 
confidence and access to bank finance suffered sharp declines putting further pressure to 
the firms’ lifespan (Acharya et al., 2015; Ferrando et al., 2015; ECB, 2013).  Hence, firms 
were called to adopt further structural reforms to address domestic market position, and 
improve their competiveness in global markets. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of the 
Portuguese economy. Section 3 describes the longitudinal linked employer employee data 
used, the Quadros de Pessoal from Portugal. In Section 4 we present our empirical strategy 
and econometric specification. Estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Overview of the Portuguese economy 
 
In the early 2000s, Portugal was reported as having high rates of labour force participation 
and low unemployment rates. This strong labour market performance was typically 
explained by flexible real wage adjustments and an expansion in the use of atypical 
contracts such as temporary and/or fixed term employment. The challenge to policymakers 
was to raise the income levels and increase competitiveness through improving the 
productivity of the labour force by enhancing human capital and labour mobility. Low-
skilled sectors were facing greater levels of competition from new EU members, 
suggesting that the economy needed to shift its production towards more high-
skilled/higher-value-added sectors (OECD, 2004).  
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Since 2006, however, the OECD reported concerns about rising unemployment in 
Portugal, and the need to prevent cyclical unemployment from becoming structural 
(OECD, 2010). More attention was drawn to restrictive employment protection legislation 
which acted as a barrier to labour mobility. Low levels of mobility encouraged firms to use 
fixed-term contracts which reduced incentives to provide training (OECD, 2006). The 
strategy adopted was to impose less restrictive employment legislation, in order to 
facilitate labour mobility, create jobs, and integrate job seekers back into work. This was 
expected to shorten unemployment spells and encourage firms to offer permanent contracts 
and provide training opportunities for their employees. Although the Portuguese economy 
continued to grow after the financial crisis’ burst (see Pereira and Wemans, 2015), it had 
previously started, however, flashing warning signs (e.g. low productivity growth, large 
budget and current accounts’ deficits) of potential economic deterioration (Blanchard, 
2007). In April 2011, Portugal became the third Eurozone country (after Greece and 
Ireland) to receive a “bailout”. Since 2008, one in seven jobs has been lost, the volume of 
productive investment has declined by over one third, average per capita income has 
declined over 10%, the self-employment rate has decreased from 19% in 2007 to 16.8% in 
2012, and the unemployment rate of young people exceeded 37% in 2013 (ILO, 2014). 
Using time series data for the Portuguese economy over the period 1995-2014 
(Bank of Portugal, 2015) we dated the phases of the economic cycle.2 Figure 1 plots 
Portuguese GDP quarterly data (in million euros) for the period 1995 to 2014. As can be 
seen, over the period of analysis the economic cycle shows 3 peaks: first quarter of 2002, 
first quarter of 2008 and third quarter of 2010 (2002q1, 2008q1, and 2010q3); and 3 
troughs (2003q2, 2009q1, and 2012q4). Specifically, the first phase of economic 
contraction (2002q1 – 2003q2) is associated to the dot-com crisis. The second phase of 
economic contraction (2008q1 – 2009q1) relates to the Global Financial Crisis. The phase 
of economic expansion that followed is likely to be due to the conjuncture of “The 
European Economic Recovery Plan” [EERP] of November 2008 aimed at controlling the 
effects of the financial crisis. The EERP had two pillars: (i) a major injection of purchasing 
power into the economy, to boost demand and stimulate confidence (European 
Commission, 2008: p. 2) and (ii) short-term actions to reinforce long-term competition 
through strategic investments, and other measures to support product- and labour-markets. 
In summary, the EERP proposed “a counter-cyclical macro-economic response to the crisis 
                                                 
2The turning points of the series were identified applying NBER's methodology (Bry and Boschan, 1971) to 
quarterly data, as suggested by Harding and Pagan (2002), using Stata routine -sbbq- by Bracke (2011). 
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in the form of an ambitious set of actions to support the real economy. The aim is to avoid 
a deep recession.” (EC, 2008: p. 6). Despite the overall aim of the EERP the Portuguese 
economy experienced a severe economic contraction between 2010q3-2012q4, as a result 
of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of late 2009. 
For the sake of providing an overview of the demography of all Portuguese firms 
(regardless of having registered employees), we use Eurostat (2015) data on firms’ births 
and deaths for the period 2004-2014.3 Figure 2 shows that until 2008 there was net firm 
creation in the country, as the number of firm births outweighed the number of firm deaths. 
The stock of firms in the Portuguese economy, however, started to decline from 2008 
onwards. The number of firm births was severely reduced until 2010, while the number of 
firm deaths remained at high levels. Our main interest lies in the hazard of firm shutdown, 
and we are particularly interested in identifying whether the effect of firm size varies not 
only over the business cycle, but also with the type of shock (Financial Crisis, Sovereign 
Debt Crisis) that leads to the phases of economic contraction. 
 
Figure 1: The Portuguese Business Cycle (1994-2014) 
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3According to Eurostat (2015) metadata a firm death amounts to the dissolution of a combination of 
production factors with the restriction that no other firms are involved in the event. Deaths do not include 
exits from the population due to mergers, take-overs, break-ups or restructuring of a set of firms. Also, it does 
not include exits from a sub-population resulting only from a change of activity.  
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Figure 2: The demography of Portuguese firms (all active companies) 
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3. Data 
 
The data used in this study are from the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) from Portugal. This is a 
longitudinal data set with matched information on workers and firms from 2002 to 2012.4 
The data have been collected annually since 1985 by the Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment and the participation of firms with registered employees is compulsory by 
law. All information – on both the firm and its employees – is reported by the firm. 
Furthermore, firms are required to have the survey available for public consultation which 
ensures an unusual level of data coverage and accuracy. The data include all firms (over 
250,000 per year) and employees (more than two million per year) within the Portuguese 
private sector. Each firm and each worker has a unique registration number which allows 
them to be traced over time. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing and services, and 
the resulting sample is composed of 544,645 unique firms contributing to 2,818,631firm-
year observations over the period.5 Our data does not explicitly identify firm closures. 
Hence, we assume that attrition from the sample is a result of firms exiting the market, and 
the variable reporting a firm’s death takes the value 1 in year t if the firm is observed in 
year t but not in t+1, and 0 otherwise. 6 
                                                 
4QP data were not collected in 2001, hence our analysis starts in 2002; 2012 is the most recent year for which 
the data set has been built.  
5We exclude the primary sector (agriculture, fishing, extraction) as most firms are family businesses and 
coverage of this sector in the QP data is small.  
6We are not able to distinguish the reason why firms close. 
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In Table 1 we provide a brief description of the sample size and rates of firm 
shutdown by year. Both the stock of firms in each year and the proportion of firms dying 
between two time periods reveal the effects of the Great Recession. For example, in 
column (i) we find that the number (stock) of private sector firms in the economy initially 
rises from 234,338 firms in 2002 to 283,262 in 2008. In 2009 there was net destruction of 
about 8,000 firms with the stock of active companies being 275,593. The number of firms 
shutting down between t and t+1 as a proportion of the number of firms in year t ranged 
from nearly 10% in the first half of the decade to 20% in 2009 and 17% in 2011 (column 
ii). Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, there was net reduction in the stock of 
firms in the Portuguese economy, and the number of active firms in 2012 was the lowest 
observed over the period of analysis.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of firms and death rates over the period, 2002-2012 
 
      
Year Firms Death  rate (%) 
 (i) (ii) 
2002 234,338 9.79 
2003 243,530 9.11 
2004 251,106 9.53 
2005 270,600 10.22 
2006 273,103 10.33 
2007 279,046 11.19 
2008 283,262 12.43 
2009 275,593 20.02 
2010 243,330 12.92 
2011 239,417 17.28 
2012 225,306 n.a. 
Total (2002-12) 2,818,631 11.33 
Notes: A firm is assumed to close over the course of year 
t if it is last observed in t; death rates are percentages of 
the stock of firms in year t. Firm closures are not 
identifiable in 2012, the last year of our sample. Own 
calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal 2002-2012. 
 
In Figure 3 we plot the number of active firms and firm deaths based on our 
estimation sample (firms with registered employees) and find that the pattern on the stock 
of firms and number of firm deaths is similar to that reported earlier in Figure 2 (using 
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Eurostat’s Business Demography data that considers all types of firms) the stock of firms 
increases until 2008, and declines thereafter and firm deaths soar in 2008.7 
 
Figure 3: Active companies and number of deaths - estimation sample 
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4. Econometric specification 
 
We analyse the determinants of the risk of firm shutdown by estimating duration models of 
the probability of firm shutdown in t+1 conditional on survival up to time t. The key focus 
in this analysis is on whether, and if so how, the impact of firm size changed during the 
recent crises. We estimate the hazard rate of firm shutdown between two consecutive years 
(t and t+1) using a discrete time multivariate proportional hazards approach. In particular, 
we apply a complementary log-log model with firm-specific random effects (Jenkins, 
2005).8 The nature of our data implies that we have an inflow sample with left truncation 
and right censoring. That is, we include in our sample all firms existing in 2002 plus firms 
that were created between 2002 and 2012, and we observe only a proportion of them 
                                                 
7Eurostat data contains information on all firms, regardless of whether or not they have registered employees. 
However, since the QP database we are using for the econometric analyses only contains information of 
companies with registered employees, for the sake of comparison we re-plot Figure 2 excluding the 
information on Personally owned and no limit to personal liability companies (these are more likely to be 
firms without registered employees). The new figure is presented in appendix (Figure A1).  
8We use this discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazards model because our data 
are interval censored. That is, we know the firm leaves the panel between t and t+1 but we do not know the 
exact date when this event occurs. 
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shutting down over the period. Because information on the year the firm was created is 
available in our data, we are able to model the time dependence of the risk of closing. In 
other words we can model the correlation between the probability of firm shutdown and 
the age of the firm (see Jovanovic, 1982). We do this using a non-parametric baseline 
hazard rate identified by duration-interval-specific dummy variables. We allow the 
baseline hazard rate to vary yearly up to the 50th year of survival of the firm. We assume 
the hazard to be the constant thereafter. 
The hazard rate h(t) is conditional on a range of observed covariates (x) as well as 
firm survival (t), such that 
; x) t |T (T = th(t) = jj ≥Pr      (1) 
We assume that firm j shuts down between t and t+1 with probability Pr(yjt=1)= λ j and that 
it survives with probability Pr(yjt=0)=1– λ j. We further assume that this probability is a 
function of covariates (x) and of an unobserved firm-specific effect (ψ j), such that the 
hazard rate can be expressed by the following: 
jk22110jt ...= ψββββλ +++++ kjtjtjt xxx     (2) 
Although our underlying continuous time model is summarized by the hazard rate h(t), our 
data is interval-censored (that is, we do not know the exact date when a firm closes). 
Therefore, we estimate the parameters describing the hazard rate taking into account the 
discrete nature of the duration data using a complementary log-log specification 
j22110]1log[log ψ+++++−− kjtkjtjtjt xβ...xβxβ =β)λ(  (3) 
This implies 
β
λ
jtxe
jt e
−
−= 1ˆ
   (4) 
where jtλ
)
is the estimated hazard rate of firm shutdown conditional on the vector of 
observed characteristics (x) that includes: the firms’ size (micro, small, medium, large)9, 
ownership of the firm (whether private-national, public, or foreign owned), natural log of 
the firm’s sales volume (in real terms) and the legal form of the firm (whether quota 
society, individual name, unipersonal quota society, anonymous society or other), industry 
                                                 
9
 Firm size is measured as the number of employees working at the firm. Firms are grouped into four 
categories of size: (i) micro, if they employ less than 10 workers; (ii) small, if they employ more than 9 and 
less than 50 workers; (iii) medium, if they employ more than 49 and less than 250 workers; and are (iv) large, 
if the employ more than 249 workers. 
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(17 industries), region (North, Algarve, Centre, Lisbon, Alentejo, and Islands). We also 
control for aggregate characteristics of the labour force to account for human capital 
accumulation (mean seniority, mean potential labour market experience, proportion of 
workers that have university degrees, and proportion of high-skilled workers10), and for the 
stability of workforce, since a more stable workforce is likely to accumulate more firm-
specific human capital and, consequently, be more productive (proportion of women, mean 
age of the workforce, proportion of fixed-term contracts and of part-time workers). As 
discussed previously, time dependence is captured by a set of variables indicating the 
firm’s age. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are shown in Table 2 below.11  
 
5. Estimates of hazards of firm-shutdown 
 
In this section we examine whether the effect of firm size varies over the business cycle 
and with the type of shock associated to the phase of economic contraction. To this end, we 
construct a time index to separate the pre-crisis period (2002-2007) from the financial 
crisis period (2008-2009) and the sovereign debt crisis period (2010-2012), although the 
two crises are interrelated. We then estimate a model that allows the impact of size to vary 
before and during the crisis, using a specification where size is interacted with the time 
indicator variable. Estimates of the hazard of firm shutdown are presented in Table 3, for 
the whole sample, and in Table 4 for the sample split into sub-periods (pre-crisis and 
crisis). We report hazard ratios which summarise the proportional effect on the hazard rate 
of a one unit change in the covariates, such that a hazard ratio above (below) one implies a 
proportionate increase (decrease) in the probability of a firm dying. 
 
 
                                                 
10Firms are requested to classify workers into nine skill levels according to the complexity and responsibility 
of the tasks performed; we group these into three categories: high, medium and low skilled workers. 
11
 The average rate of firm closures over the period of analysis is 12%. Smaller firms dominate the market 
with 97% of the firms in this sample being micro (less than 10 workers) or small firms (with 10 to 49 
employees). The average sales volume is about 49 thousand euros (exp(ln(10.799)). About 4% of the firms 
are foreign owned, and 8% has more than one establishment. Regarding the covariates that proxy for human 
capital accumulation, workers’ mean potential labour market experienced is 22 years, while mean seniority in 
the firm is nearly 6 years. On average, the composition of the firms’ labour force involves 18% of high 
skilled workers and 8% of university graduates. Considering our proxies on the stability of the labour force, 
on average 21% of the firms’ workforce is employed with temporary contracts, 4% are part-timers, and 47% 
are women. In Table A1 in appendix we show correlations between the explanatory variables. 
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Table 2:  Summary statistics of firm-level data (sample means) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Firm shutdown 0.123 
Size (baseline: large) 
   Medium 0.023  
   Small 0.153  
   Micro 0.821  
Period (baseline: pre-crisis) 
   Crisis (2008-2009) 0.215  
   Crisis (2010-2012) 0.186  
Ln(sales volume) 10.799 3.896 
Ownership (baseline: private national) 
   Public 0.002  
   Foreign 0.039  
Multi-establishment 0.077  
Legal form (baseline: limited liability quota societies) 
   Personally owned - unlimited liability 0.238  
   Personally owned - lim. liab. quota soc. 0.024  
   Anonymous societies 0.038  
   Other 0.057  
Proportion of high-skilled workers (%) 18.294 30.802 
Proportion of university graduates (%) 8.242 21.498 
Proportion of temporary contracts (%) 20.809 34.067 
Proportion of part-timers (%) 4.369 16.799 
Proportion of women (%) 46.652 41.708 
Proportion of foreign nationals (%) 4.624 17.343 
Mean experience in the labour market  21.244 9.182 
Mean seniority at the firm 5.597 5.365 
Mean age of employee’s 38.115 8.919 
No. of observations 2,593,080  
Note: Controls for industry, region, and a fully non-parametric 
specification of the firms’ survival time (age) are included in the 
multivariate analysis. Their descriptive statistics are omitted in the table 
for the sake of space. Standard deviations for continuous variables only. 
 
 
Estimates using the full sample are presented in Table 3. In column (1) of Table 3, 
we present a basic model that, besides the set of covariates mentioned above, includes only 
the main effects of the firm size categories and the time periods. The next three columns of 
Table 3 include interaction terms between firm size and time period. In column (2) we 
include the following period indicators: Financial Crisis (2008-2009) and Debt Crisis 
(2010-2012) as covariates, the omitted category is the pre-crisis period; in column (3) we 
include one period indicator: Financial Crisis (2008-2009), all other periods are included in 
the baseline; in column (4) we include one period indicator: Debt Crisis (2010-2012), the 
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other two periods are omitted. Results in Table 3 show that, in general, smaller firms are 
more likely to shutdown than larger firms. In particular, the hazard of firm shutdown is 
found to be nearly 3 times larger for micro firms relative to larger firms. As firm size 
increases, however, the hazard ratio declines, with small firms having between 30% and 
37% higher hazard rates of shutdown than larger firms, whereas the medium sized firms 
are only 14% more likely to go out of business (column 3). 
The previous results can be partly understood under the Schumpeterian competition 
model of Nelson and Winter (1982). Large firms have more resources to withstand 
competitive pressures and demand shocks, and spend more in R&D than small firms. This 
may increase their chances of finding a better technology that will induce productivity 
gains and contribute to further firm growth (Cefis and Marsili, 2005).  The productivity 
gains make it profitable for firms to hire more workers as long as they have a market that 
absorbs the increases in production. Because large firms can exploit a new technology on a 
relatively large scale they adopt new technology more quickly which increases their 
chances of survival compared to smaller firms (Kepler and Simons, 2000). Additionally, 
large firms are required to disclose financial information related to payment practices and 
performance (Storey, 1994) thus minimising information asymmetries and monitoring 
costs. In contrast, financial reports produced by small firms are relatively simple and 
mainly for tax purposes (Tsaih et al., 2004) and not readily available to financial 
institutions (e.g. banks) when seeking funding to finance investment and sustain growth 
(see Fraser et al., 2015). Furthermore, large firms have greater assets (which can be used as 
collateral) than small firms and thus, are more likely to be charged lower rates when 
borrowing and are less likely to experience loan rejection and discouragement (Saridakis 
and Storey, 2009).  
In column (2) of Table 3 we report the coefficients of the financial and sovereign 
debt crises dummies and their interactions with firm size. The time period dummy 
variables are found to be individually and jointly (Wald test statistic of 41.28 with a p-
value of 0.00) statistically significant.12 In particular, we find that during the financial 
crisis firms have higher hazard of closing down than in the pre-crisis period, and the risk 
was even higher in the years of sovereign debt crisis (the hazard ratio ranges from 1.98 in 
the financial crisis to 2.54 in the debt crisis). When the crises dummies are interacted with 
firm size, we find that the relative risk of shutdown differs only between medium sized 
                                                 
12
 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the main effects of the time periods are statistically equal to those 
obtained in column 1. 
14 
 
firms and large firms during the financial crisis period.13 Specifically, medium sized firms 
are found to have around 33% higher hazard rate of shutdown than larger firms. This can 
be partly explained by difficulties in access to credit. Indeed during the two crises, loans to 
SMEs have decreased substantially and interest rates on new loans have increased nearly 2 
percentage points between the 2010 and 2012 (ILO, 2014), with 21% of the Portuguese 
firms reporting access to finance as a major obstacle in their business operations (ECB, 
2013). Additionally, we can argue that medium sized firms usually operate under a 
structure similar to that of large firms (see Storey et al., 2010) and face similar problems, 
but have fewer resources available to overcome them. In contrast, micro and smaller firms 
are able to respond flexibly and operate under fewer structural constraints (Smallbone et 
al., 2012). Similar results emerge when we estimate the model including each crisis 
dummy at a time. 14 
Table A3 in the appendix reports the coefficients of a few other covariates used as 
controls in our specifications. Our results suggest that firms with larger sales volumes15, 
public and foreign owned firms, as well as multi plant firms have a lower risk of closing. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that these firms may have stronger market positions and 
greater scope for strategic choices and (internal and external) alliances to withstand 
economic crises. Quota societies have significantly lower hazards of shutdown than firms 
based on other legal forms. Regarding the aggregate characteristics of the labour force, we 
conclude that our proxies for human capital accumulation (see Bosma et al., 2004; Bruderl 
et al., 1992) and proxies for the stability of the labour force are important determinants of 
firms’ survival rates. For example, firms with greater proportions of university graduates 
and where the workers have higher mean labour market experience and seniority at the 
firm have lower hazards of shutting down. On the other hand, firms with greater intensity 
of fixed-term contracts, part-time workers, foreign nationals, and older workers have 
greater probabilities of closing.  
 
                                                 
13
 We have tested the joint significance of the firm size variables and also performed a joint test that all 
coefficients associated with the interactions between time period and size are zero. All covariates are jointly 
statistically significant with a p-value below 1%. 
14
 We have run a model combining the effect of the two crises together. These results also confirm that 
smaller firms are more likely to shutdown than larger firms. We also find that the hazard for firm shutdown is 
nearly 2 times larger during the combined crisis period (2008-2012) compared with the pre-crisis period. 
However, the interactions with the firm size are found to be statistically insignificant suggesting that the 
separation of the two crises provide a more informative approach (see Table A2 in appendix).  
15
 We also examine whether the firm size results are affected by the exclusion of the log (sales volume). 
However, we find that excluding this variable makes no difference in the results reported here (these results 
are available upon request). 
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Table 3: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, full sample 
 
 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm size (baseline: large)  
  
Medium 1.165** 1.077 1.140* 1.234*** 
(0.082) (0.110) (0.090) (0.097) 
Small 1.361*** 1.295*** 1.370*** 1.367*** 
(0.093) (0.127) (0.104) (0.103) 
Micro 2.768*** 2.907*** 2.785*** 2.643*** 
(0.189) (0.284) (0.210) (0.199) 
Time period (baseline: pre-crisis) 
Crisis (2008-2009) 1.936*** 1.976*** 1.454*** 
(0.010) (0.305) (0.206) 
Crisis (2010-2012) 2.207*** 2.543*** 1.862*** 
(0.015) (0.396) (0.266) 
 
Medium*Crisis (2008-2009)  1.332* 1.358** 
 (0.214) (0.201) 
Medium*Crisis (2010-2012)  0.957 0.817 
 (0.158) (0.123) 
Small*Crisis (2008-2009)  1.216 1.243 
 (0.188) (0.177) 
Small*Crisis (2010-2012)  0.977 0.870 
 (0.153) (0.125) 
Micro*Crisis (2008-2009)  0.959 1.024 
 (0.148) (0.145) 
Micro*Crisis (2010-2012)  0.857 0.820 
 (0.134) (0.117) 
Constant 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log-Likelihood -905,015 -904,888 -911,992 -913,966 
Nb. Observations 2,593,080 2,593,080 2,593,080 2,593,080 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard model of firm shutdown, controlling for firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity. Hazard ratios reported, SE in parenthesis (* p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01). Further covariates relating to characteristics of the firm and of the 
workforce, mentioned in Section 4, were included in the specification but, for the sake 
of space, their estimates are not shown here and are provided in Table A3 in appendix. 
 
 
Additionally, Figure 4 illustrates how the predicted risk of firm shutdown evolves 
with the age of the firm and reveals the nature of duration dependence. In line with 
previous work (e.g. Pakes and Ericson, 1995), we find that the hazard of firm shutdown is 
generally declining with time (negative duration dependence). However, the rate at which 
the hazard declines over time is not constant. In the first four years the risk of firm closure 
16 
 
is very high and declines only marginally (hazard rate of about 1.6 between the second and 
fourth years of age). The hazard steadily declines between the 5th and 20th year that a firm 
is in the market, and remains relatively constant thereafter (at about 0.8). In Table A4 in 
appendix we report the mean predicted hazards by firm size and time period.  
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated pattern of duration dependence  
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In Table 4 we present sub-sample estimates of the hazard of firm closures, the 
parameterization of each of the columns in the Table is as follows: in column (1) we 
consider only observations of the pre-crisis period (2002-2007), and include indicators of 
firm size; in columns (2) and (3) the crisis period is considered (2008-2012). In column (2) 
we include indicators for size and time period (omitted category is the 2008-2009 Crisis); 
in column (3) we further add terms on the interaction of firm size and time period. 
Similarly to the earlier Table, results in Table 4 also suggest that smaller firms have higher 
hazard rates of closing than larger firms. However, during the crisis the hazard rate is 
found to be lower for micro firms than in the pre-crisis level, whereas it increases for small 
and medium sized firms (contrast coefficients of firm size in columns (2) and (3) to those 
in column (1)).16 We also find that firms face a higher probability of going out of business 
                                                 
16
 We have tested the hypothesis that each coefficient of size of the models in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 
are equal to the estimated parameter of firm size in column (1). For the specification in column (2) we reject 
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during the sovereign debt crisis rather than during the financial crisis (hazard ratios of the 
period dummy of 1.03 and 1.23, columns (2) and (3) respectively). When the sovereign 
debt crisis dummy interacts with the firm size, we find that medium sized firms have lower 
hazard rate of closing than large organizations (hazard ratio of 0.70, column (3)). This can 
be due to the sectors where large firms operate which may be more likely to be affected by 
the recession (e.g. construction sector) hence more likely to lay off (talented) workers who 
can then seek employment in smaller firms (Lai et al., 2016; Saridakis, 2012). 
 
 
Table 4: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, by period 
 Pre-crisis Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Firm size (baseline: large)  
Medium 1.065 1.254** 1.465*** 
(0.109) (0.113) (0.183) 
Small 1.252** 1.374*** 1.542*** 
(0.124) (0.119) (0.187) 
Micro 2.657*** 2.371*** 2.563*** 
(0.263) (0.206) (0.310) 
Period (baseline: Crisis (2008-2009)) 
Crisis (2010-2012) 1.033*** 1.228 
(0.007) (0.211) 
Medium*Crisis (2010-2012)  0.703** 
(0.126) 
Small*Crisis (2010-2012)  0.778 
(0.134) 
Micro*Crisis (2010-2012)  0.850 
(0.146) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log-likelihood -477,078 -427,107 -427,090 
Nb. observations 1,551,582 1,041,498 1,041,498 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard models of firm shutdown, 
controlling for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. Hazard ratios 
reported, SE in parenthesis (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Further covariates relating to characteristics of the firm and of the 
workforce, mentioned in Section 4 were included in the 
specification but their estimates are not shown. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient of medium sized firms is equal to the estimated parameter in 
column (1). We also reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of medium and small firms in column (3) are 
equal to the estimated parameters in column (1). 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed a panel of employer-employee data from Portugal to empirically 
investigate whether the effect of firm size varies over the business cycle and with the 
shocks from the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Although the two crises are 
interrelated, their effects are found to be different in nature and received different policy 
responses. We find a number of key results. First, smaller firms are more likely to 
shutdown than larger firms, with micro firms being nearly three times more likely to 
shutdown than large firms. Second, micro firms are found to experience higher hazard 
rates of closing during the pre-crisis period than during crisis period. Third, this is not the 
case for larger sized firms for whom the closure rate is found to increase during the 
recession. The reasons for this are not reported in the data but may be postulated. Micro 
firms, for example, are less exposed to foreign financial markets and risks, are less 
dependent on bank credit, and their HR procedures are more discretionary and flexible 
compared with larger firms. These factors allow micro firms to work more flexibly, rather 
than undertake structural shifts, and adapt to recession conditions in such a way that 
enables them to survive (Reid, 2007; Grewal and Tansuhaj, 2001; Hitt, et al., 1998; 
Smallbone et al., 2012; Cowling et al., 2014). Fourth, we find that medium sized firms 
were more vulnerable during the financial crisis period than large firms, but showed more 
resilience during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, the results suggest that the sovereign 
debt crisis had higher impact on the risk of firm shutdown than the financial crisis.  
The above analysis raises important questions and provides strategic options for 
interventions both by entrepreneurs and policy makers. Small businesses may seek to build 
financial resilience and capabilities to cope with challenging and prolonged environmental 
shocks (see also Smallbone et al., 2012). This can be done, for example, by reducing their 
dependence on conventional sources of external funding from financial institutions and 
cost-cutting measures when facing distress. In particular, small firms may be proactive and 
exploit new market opportunities, such as through foreign alliances, and adjust their 
product/service portfolio, business and labour market strategies to minimise risk and 
sustain competitive advantage to withstand times of economic turmoil and instability. 
Public policy may seek to encourage strategic changes and innovation within small 
organisations, and support innovation and new business ideas to help businesses mitigate 
the impact of recession (for detailed discussion, see Kitching et al., 2009). 
19 
 
 Additionally, the unevenness of the impact of the sovereign and financial crises 
suggests that policy needs to be more attuned to help ameliorate the effects of specific 
crises rather than mere ‘blanket’ approaches. The uneven effects on firms of different sizes 
also suggest a need for some fine-tuning of interventions for enterprises of different sizes. 
This will inevitably involve both fiscal and monetary strategic interventions. It is 
questionable, however, whether the fiscal consolidation and expenditure cuts are 
appropriate or else they may lead to the medicine being worse than the actual economic 
malaise. This is an issue that deserves future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: The demography of Portuguese firms (excluding personally owned  
And no limit to personal liability companies) 
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Table A1:  Correlations between explanatory variables 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
 
        
Shutdown Size Time ln(sales) Plant age Ownership Multiplant Legal Form 
Shutdown 1.0000 
Size 0.0951 1.0000 
Time 0.0723 0.0080 1.0000 
ln(sales) -0.1240 -0.2555 0.0626 1.0000 
Plant age -0.0855 -0.1969 0.0646 0.2121 1.0000 
Ownership 0.0201 -0.0527 0.2522 0.0202 0.0318 1.0000 
Multiplant -0.0395 -0.2688 0.0800 0.1239 0.1032 0.0583 1.0000 
Legal Form 0.0016 -0.1198 0.0612 -0.1571 0.1351 0.1413 0.0608 1.0000 
 
Panel B: Workforce characteristics 
Shutdown 
% High 
skill 
% Uni. 
Grads 
% Fixed 
term 
% Part 
Time 
% 
Women 
% 
Foreign 
Mean 
Exper. 
Mean 
Tenure 
Shutdown 1.0000 
%High skill 0.0021 1.0000 
% Uni. Grads -0.0070 0.4476 1.0000 
% Fixed term 0.0417 -0.0593 0.0112 1.0000 
% Part Time 0.0235 0.0142 0.0577 0.0464 1.0000 
% Women 0.0098 0.0070 0.0648 0.0457 0.1174 1.0000 
% Foreign Nationals 0.0434 -0.0463 -0.0223 0.2117 0.0237 -0.0261 1.0000 
Mean Experience 0.0137 0.0129 -0.1770 -0.1405 0.0625 -0.0285 -0.0409 1.0000 
Mean Tenure -0.0690 0.0425 -0.0577 -0.2876 -0.0208 -0.0162 -0.1284 0.3928 1.0000 
Note: correlations based on the estimation sample. 
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Table A2: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, alternative specification of the crisis period (2008-2012) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Firm size (baseline: large)  
Medium 1.180** 1.094 
 
(0.083) (0.111) 
Small 1.382*** 1.321*** 
 
(0.094) (0.129) 
Micro 2.800*** 2.963*** 
 
(0.190) (0.288) 
Crisis (2008-2012) 1.988*** 2.184*** 
 
(0.010) (0.281) 
Medium*Crisis (2008-2012)  1.146 
 
 (0.155) 
Small*Crisis (2008-2012)  1.091 
 
 (0.141) 
Micro*Crisis (2008-2012)  0.894 
 
 (0.115) 
Constant 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log-Likelihood -905,245 -905,134 
Nb. Observations 2,593,080 2,593,080 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard models of firm shutdown, controlling for firm-
level unobserved heterogeneity. Hazard ratios reported, SE in parenthesis (* p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01). Further covariates relating to characteristics of the workforce, 
mentioned in Section 4, were included in the specification but their estimates are not 
shown. 
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Table A3: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, full sample (Table 3 ctd.) 
 
 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(sales volume) 0.942*** 0.941*** 0.946*** 0.944*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership (Baseline: private national) 
    Public 0.6121*** 0.611*** 0.649*** 0.611*** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) 
    Foreign 0.946*** 0.947*** 1.349*** 0.942*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
Multiplant firm 0.796*** 0.795*** 0.874*** 0.810*** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Legal form (Baseline: quota societies) 
   Individual name 1.824*** 1.821*** 1.641*** 1.693*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
   Unipersonal quota soc. 1.062*** 1.063*** 1.702*** 1.091*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
   Anonymous society 1.089*** 1.085*** 1.074*** 1.073*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
   Other 1.087*** 1.086*** 1.040*** 1.051*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of high skilled  1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% University graduates 0.997*** 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Fixed term contracts 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Part-time workers 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.002*** 1.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Women 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Foreign nationals 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean experience in LM 0.948*** 0.948*** 0.932*** 0.926*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mean seniority at firm 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.993*** 0.993*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean age 1.068*** 1.068*** 1.087*** 1.095*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Note: As in Table 3. 
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Table A4: Predicted hazard of firm shutdown, by time period and firm size categories 
 Pre-crisis Financial Crisis Sovereign debt crisis Overall 
Large 0.018 0.034 0.036 0.025 
Medium 0.023 0.060 0.046 0.035 
Small 0.035 0.079 0.072 0.050 
Micro 0.106 0.187 0.191 0.139 
Overall 0.092 0.167 0.169 0.123 
Note: Predicted probabilities in this table are based on the results from  the model specification 
in column 2 of Table 3 
 
 
